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Alevi Cultural Heritage in Turkey
and Germany: Negotiating “Useable




1 Since the beginning of the millennium a number of activities have been carried out by
UNESCO to promote the safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity.
The Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage in 2003 was followed by
the Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expression (2005)
to  maintain  and  “enrich  cultural  diversity”,  with  Intangible  Cultural  Heritage
considered to be the “mainspring” of cultural pluralism (UNESCO Convention 2003: §3).
2 In  2010  a  committee  consisting  of  members  elected  by  state  parties  of  UNESCO’s
General Assembly decided to include the ritual dance semah, a sequence of the Alevi-
Bektaşi1 cem ritual2, on the Representative List of Intangible Cultural Heritage. Alevi-Bektaşi
heritage  was  subsequently  listed  on  Turkey’s  National  Inventory  of  Cultural  Heritage,
“fostering  and  enriching  [the]  traditional  music  culture  of  Turkey”  (UNESCO
Nomination file 2010: 6).
3 The latter aspect of its inscription on Turkey’s inventory list is particularly remarkable.
Alevi history in the Republic of Turkey as well as in the Ottoman Empire has often been
perceived by many Alevis as constituting a “history of suppression” (Göner 2005: 111)
with ongoing issues of institutional, cultural, and social marginalization. Recognition of
the contribution of  an Alevi  ritual  to  the enrichment of  Turkey’s  cultural  diversity
would  thus  seem  to  challenge  the  nation’s  dominant  Sunni-Turkist  conception  of
belonging.  Furthermore,  it  would  also  appear  to  support  UNESCO’s  objective  of
empowering  vernacular  groups  by  safeguarding  their  creative  cultural  practices  as
Intangible Cultural  Heritage,  ICH.  Three years after the categorization of  the semah
ritual as Cultural Heritage in Turkey, members of the Alevi community in Germany,
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Almanya Alevi Birlikleri Federasyonu, AABF, raised the possibility of inscripting the semah
ritual  onto the Representative List  via a  federal  UNESCO bureau.  Prohibition of  the
performance  of  the  ritual  in  Turkey  was  given  as  the  rationale  for  its  required
protection and recognition as Cultural Heritage in Germany (Tauschek 2013: 23).
4 In Turkey, while the ritual in question is not an entirely forbidden practice there are
continuing  institutional  and  social  constraints,  which  serve  to  limit  the  public
expression  of  Aleviness.  References  made  by  the  AABF  representative  to  an  Alevi
Cultural Heritage and the limitations imposed on Alevi religious life in Turkey offers an
insight into the uses of Cultural Heritage discourse and suggests that there is more to
Cultural  Heritage  than  the  mere  preservation  of  certain  aspects  of  the  past.  The
language of Cultural Heritage and references to intergovernmental institutions such as
UNESCO are used by cultural, social or ethnic(ized) groups to express demands for the
recognition and representation of their identities. The contested / iterated notion of
semah as Alevi heritage in Turkey and Germany indicates the extent and dissemination,
both geographically  and socially,  of  the  actors  involved in  the  negotiation of  Alevi
Cultural Heritage. This paper seeks to analyse the multiple ways in which the concept
of Cultural Heritage has been used by Alevi organizations in Germany and Turkey. In
order to grasp the capacities (and limitations) of the concept of Cultural Heritage in the
negotiation of ideas about identity and the nation’s past, I will argue that references to
Cultural  Heritage have to be understood in terms of  their  political  dimensions and
social implications (for both civil actors and nation-states). What specific ideas about
belonging and cultural or religious alterity are put into practice and rendered true by
these policies? In what ways do Alevi communities involved in the process position
themselves and act in accordance or opposition to these discourses? What is the ratio
of empowerment and containment within these governmentalities of heritage, which
celebrate diversity on the one hand, while denying legal recognition on the other?
5 In order to understand the multiple layers of Alevi heritage discourse in Germany and
Turkey the paper first seeks to provide an overview of the institutional and discursive
background  of  Alevi  organizations  in  both  countries  and  in  “transnational  space”
(Sökefeld 2008). Analysis of the development and conceptualization of Alevi Cultural
Heritage reveals the very specific imaginations of national and group identities that
emerge in heritage regimes. Here also the multiple capacities of heritage policies for
identity-formation,  the  politics  of  recognition  and the  governance  of  diversity  are
explored,  an  aspect  which  requires  greater  emphasis  if  critical  studies  on  Cultural
Heritage  are  to  resist  the  tendency  towards  rather  naïve  narratives  of  agency,
empowerment,  and  the  representation  of  minority  issues  by  governments  and
intergovernmental actors.
 
I. Alevis and their Ritual Practice: Organizing Alevism
in Turkey, Germany, and Transnational Space
6 Up until  the end of the 1980s Alevi-related matters were comparably less visible in
public space and politics than today, a development which is applicable to the case of
both  Germany  and  Turkey  (Dressler  2013:  12).  In  Germany,  Alevi  immigrants  were
categorized according to their nationality and thus listed on the population census as
Turkish citizens. In Turkey Alevism has long remained an unrecognized (or silenced)
phenomenon: The Turkish nation-state since the Treaty of  Lausanne has been built
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upon a Turkish-(Sunni) Islamic notion of belonging that has invisibilized Kurdish and
Alevi identities as non-Turkish and / or non-Sunni respectively (Dressler 2014: 141).
However, political and socio-economic transformations occurring since the late 1980s
have contributed to the opening of Alevi associations in the larger cities of Turkey and
in Western Europe, to where many Alevis had emigrated in the 1960s and 1970s (Şahin
2005; Sökefeld 2008). The work of these organizations has largely been tolerated by the
state  and in  2007 the  AKP government  proclaiming an “Alevi  opening” launched a
series of policies aimed at redressing the political position of Alevis (Soner and Toktaş
2011: 420). Various meetings aimed at formulating Alevi demands from the state and
negotiating  their  implementation  were  attended  by  representatives  of  the  Alevi
communities  alongside  their  state  interlocutors  (Önraporu  2010:  1).  Despite  these
outward improvements,  the possibility of  expressing an Alevi  identity distinct from
Sunni Islam has remained fundamentally limited by the enduring dominance of the
Turkish-nationalist  (Sunni-Muslim)  model  of  identity  (Dressler  2014:  140).  It  is
particularly interesting to analyze Turkey’s Cultural Heritage policies and practices in
the light of the (apparently) changing attitude of the state because the recognition of
Alevi  Cultural  Heritage  and  its  inscription  onto  the  Turkish  National  Inventory  of
Heritage has (yet?) to be translated into the parallel  recognition of critical political
identity  demands  and  rights,  concerning,  for  example,  Alevi  religious  education  in
public schools or providing public funding for religious infrastructure such as cemevis3.
7 In  the  following  section  I  will  provide  an  overview  of  the  actors  involved  in  the
process(es) of defining Alevi Cultural Heritage and, in particular, of the socio-economic
developments,  which  have  engendered  changes  to  Alevi  ritual  practices.  It  will  be
argued that such transformations made the emergence of an Alevi ritual as Turkish
Cultural Heritage imaginable in the first place.
 
Alevi Organizations and the Quest for Representation
8 Although all of the organizations considered here represent a certain form of Alevism
they differ  considerably  in  political  outlook and available  socio-economic resources
(Massicard 2013: 49). However, a point of unification, canalized and (partly) expressed
by these Alevi organizations, may be found in the divergence of their devotional service
and principles of belief from Sunni Islam. For example, Alevis neither say the five daily
prayers [namaz] nor do they fast during Ramadan. In many Alevi communities a salient
aspect of Alevi ritual practice is the performance of the cem ritual by men and women
together, a factor which continues to be employed by Alevis and Sunni groups as a
distinguishing feature used to demarcate their respective differences. 4
9 Turkish nationalist ideology and the political structures upon which the Republic was
built  still  translates  into  an  institutional  setting  that  fails  to  recognize  Alevis  as  a
legitimate part of the nation, approaching Alevism as a problem to be addressed by
“sometimes  less  and sometimes  more  violent  politics  of  coercion and assimilation”
(Dressler  2014:  139).  This  polity  finds  its  expression  in  the  General  Directorate  of
Religious  Affairs,  Diyanet,  a  state  institution  defining,  controlling,  and  organizing
legitimate  forms  of  religious  life  and  one  which  does  not  recognize  Alevism  as  a
religious group distinct from Sunni Islam.
10 The organizations involved in this “multipolar movement” (Massicard 2013: 51) of Alevi
Cultural Heritage-making in Turkey are representative of very different interpretations
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of Alevism, relating, for example, to the highly contested understanding of whether
Alevism can be considered an Islamic tradition or a religion in its own right (Şahin
2005; Sökefeld 2004). In this sense it is highly remarkable that such a wide range of
Alevi actors with quite different agendas were able to unite for the sake of a common
Alevit-Bektaşi  Cultural  Heritage.  In  order  to  describe  the  diverse  range  of  Alevi
identities represented by the various associations, Soner and Toktaş employ the binary
concept of  “modernist-secular vs.  traditionalist-religious” groups (Soner and Toktaş
2011:  423).  In  their  terms  “traditionalist-religious”  organizations  like  CEM-
(Cumhuriyetçi  Eğitim  ve  kültür  Merkezi)  or  the  Ehl-i  Beyt Foundation articulate  a  more
religious interpretation of Alevism. For example, CEM Vakfı seeks the representation
and organization of Alevism within state institutions like Diyanet and thus subscribe to
a vision of  Alevism as  a  form of  Islam (Ibid.,  424).  In  contrast,  other organizations
defined  as  “modernist-secular”,  such  as  the  Alevi-Bektaşi  Federasyonu (ABF),  fear
assimilation with state institutions and thus tend to advocate for the separation of
religion  and state,  a  position  that  would  support  neither  Sunni  nor  Alevi  religious
beliefs  and  practices  (Ibid.).  Massicard,  however,  identifies  three  major  axes  along
which Alevi associations in Turkey are ideologically and practically organized. The Hacı
Bektaş Veli Anadolu Kültür Vakfı and the Alevi Kültür Derneği for example, as opposed to
the  aforementioned  CEM  Vakfı,  represent  those  parts  of  the  Alevi  movement  that
emphasize the folkloristic and cultural aspects of Alevism. Still others like the Pir Sultan
Abdal organization have adopted a more political and leftist outlook (Massicard 2013:
49).
11 Parallel to the socio-economic and political developments in Turkey from the 1980s,
comparative  changes  were  also  occurring  in  Germany.  Of  the  many different  Alevi
organizations that emerged the Almanya Alevi Birlikleri Federasyonu (AABF) constitutes
the most pertinent case study for consideration in this paper, the question of an Alevi
ritual  as  Cultural  Heritage  in  Germany  having  been  raised  by  an  AABF  member
(Tauschek 2013: 23). The organization is also an example of what Sökefeld has termed
an “opposition diaspora” (Sökefeld 2008: 250). AABF opposition against current Turkish
politics towards Alevis emerges from the organizations partial representation of the
politics of leftists exiled from Turkey in the 1970s and 1980s. Furthermore, there are
many Kurdish speaking Alevis organized within the AABF (Ibid., 230). Institutionally
speaking, the AABF holds quite a powerful position, being officially recognized as both
a  “registered  association”  [eingetragener  Verein]  and  a  “religious community”
[Religionsgemeinschaft] in the sense of § 7, 3 of the German constitution applicable in
some federal states. As such, in concert with the state it is able to organize religious
education  in  German  public  schools,  albeit  this  influence  does  not  mean  that  its
position and understandings of Alevism are uncontested by other more conservative or
religiously oriented organizations. The comparatively privileged legal standing of the
AABF sets it apart from other Sunni organizations, which do not enjoy the same degree
of institutional integration (Sökefeld 2008: 250).
12 The institutional position of the AABF is fundamental to understanding the underlying
dynamics of its capacity to act as an “opposition diaspora” and criticize the situation of
Alevis in Turkey. Sökefeld argues that institutional power alongside the endeavour to
distinguish an Alevi identity distinct from Sunni-Turkish Muslims in Germany enabled
the AABF to yield the resources for a “transnational politics of identity aiming at [the]
formal  recognition of  Alevis  in  Turkey”  (Sökefeld  2003:  135).  The utilisation of  the
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sphere  of  “transnational  space”’  for  the  articulation  of  the  identity  claims  of  the
diaspora community is argued by Sökefeld to be perceptible in the expression of “home
orientated issues” i.e. those issues concerning Alevis in Turkey (Sökefeld 2008: 221).
The  concept  of  “transnational  space”  encompasses  the multiple  connections  and
interactions of  Alevi  organizations in Germany and Turkey and opens up a field in
which the claims of an Alevi diaspora are made “against the nation-state of origin”
(Ibid.,:  250),  as  illustrated  by  the  use  of  the  discursive  framework  provided  by
intergovernmental institutions in the case of Turkey.
 
Dynamics in Ritual Practice
13 The socio-economic and political processes of rural-urban and transnational migration,
in addition to the increasing degree to which Alevism was being organized in cultural
associations,  have  resulted  in  fundamental  transformations  and  adjustments  of
religious practice (Motika and Langer 2005: 76). The public articulation of Alevi identity
in  Turkey  and  diaspora  contexts  marks  a  shift  away  from  the  former  strategy  of
concealment from non-Alevis [takiye] towards the open display of religious and cultural
assets,  a development which holds true not only for Alevis,  but also for other “Ali-
oriented religions” as well (Olsson 1998: 199). The emergence of Alevi associations have
been—  and  still  are—  accompanied  by  discussions  about  the  standardization  and
unification of Aleviness (Sarıönder 2005: 164), a process that has been highlighted by
the recognition of a common Alevi-Bektaşi Intangible Cultural Heritage. The relatively
isolated  and  scattered  geographical  location  of  Alevi  communities  alongside  the
absence of a central normative Alevi religious authority has resulted in great variation
in ritual practice. Such variation has undermined the struggle for the standardization
of ritual practice for the sake of a collectively accepted form of public ritual display.
This is  exemplified in the performance of the most important congregational ritual
among Alevis, the cem ritual, which may vary considerably in length and order. Many
Dedes (the religious specialist conducting the rituals) follow an individual approach to
the ritual. The prayers and religious hymns may subsequently differ considerably from
those used by other Dedes, while the terminology of the different sequences may vary
according to the specific historical or regional context of its performance (Langer 2008:
97). The public representation of Alevi religion and / or culture requires the definition
of the common denominators of belief and ritual practice (Göner 2005: 128). Thus, the
cem-ceremonies currently held in the associations of the big cities in Turkey and in the
Diaspora,  often omit  certain local  sequences  while  others,  such as  the ritual  dance
sequence  semah,  have  come  to  assume  a  greater  significance.  Langer,  for  example,
argues that changes have been made to the public display of the juridical part of the
ritual, in which inner-communal conflicts are resolved by the Dede. The juridical part
was frequently observed to have been removed altogether or reduced to a symbolic act
(Langer 2013: 207). In the same manner, Dinçer’s analysis of urban cem rituals in Izmir
and Istanbul,  attended by Alevis from various regions with different mother tongue
languages and alternative imaginations of ethnic belonging, revealed the dominance of
the semah, as one of the “12 services”, vis-à-vis other ritual sequences (Dinçer 2000: 37).
The tendency to emphasize specific ritual features, such as the semah, and its public
presentation has been argued to have contributed to the “de-sacralisation” of the cem 
ritual (Massicard 2013: 130). According to the UNESCO Nomination file, 2010 the semah
has clear religious connotations when conducted privately as the rhythmic movements
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symbolize the unity of man and God (UNESCO Nomination file 2010: 4). The lifting of
one hand towards the sky during the circular movements of the dance, for example,
commemorates God’s immanence in human beings and the inseparable connection of
the  two (Ibid.).5 Yet,  its  musical  and dancing characteristics  are  also  recognized to
“constitute  a  common  language  of  humanity”  (Ibid.,  6).  Such  a  focus  on  the  main
folkloristic  and  representative  symbols  of  the  Alevi  community  helps  to  overcome
divergent  imaginations  of  Alevism  in  the  religious  and  political  field.  This  “self-
folklorization”  (Massicard  2013:  130)  is  thus  identified  as  a  means  of  fostering  a
common  Alevi  identity  without  facilitating  a  corresponding  disagreement  about
contested issues,  such as the standing of Alevism towards Islam or Alevism being a
religion or culture (Ibid., 134).
14 Similar  dynamics  and  conflicts  are  also  evident  in  the  German diaspora.  Since  the
publication of the “Alevi Declaration” [Alevilik bildirgesi] in 1989, Alevism was no longer
thought  of  as  a  “religious  creed  with  secret  oral  traditions”  (Şahin  2005:  465),  but
instead was recognised as a cultural and religious identity distinct from Sunni Islam.
The manifesto, in which members of the Alevi Cultural Centre in Hamburg, Germany
publicly announced their recognition of the existence of Alevis in Turkey, is considered
to have been the first step towards a publicly articulated Alevi identity in Germany and
the “reconstitution of Alevism” after the long-practiced takiye (Sökefeld 2004: 139). The
transferal of the ritual to the public realm in the context of diaspora consequently also
brought  about  fundamental  changes  to  ritual  practice.  Comparable  to  the  Turkish
context and the changes precipitated by rural-urban migration from the 1960s, similar
processes were also discernible in the context of (trans)national migration. Here too
the complexity and duration of the cem ritual was reduced, while the public display of
the ritual  was conducted with the exclusion and emphasis  of  certain selected parts
(Motika and Langer 2005: 99).
15 The emphasis on the semah dance in the public presentation of the ritual is  all  but
uncontested  by  Alevis  themselves.  In  the  process  of  ritual  transferal  and  the
accompanying (re)invention and (re)interpretation of ritual practice, the question of
whether or not Alevism constitutes a religion or culture is continuously negotiated.
Furthermore,  the  definition  of  Alevism  not  only  differs  among  various  Alevi
organizations, but may also shift according to the specific discursive and institutional
contexts in which the actors are operating. For example, in order to exercise influence
over the question of religious education in public schools, it is first necessary to be
recognized  as  a  specific  public  corporation  representing  a  “religious  community”
[Religionsgemeinschaft] (Sökefeld 2004: 148). Conversely, the discursive and institutional
setting for the safeguarding of ICH requires a definition of ICH as the de-sacralised
remains of the past; the aim of safeguarding Cultural Heritage explicitly sets itself apart
from safeguarding religious artefacts (Tauschek 2013:  23).  If  an Alevi  ritual  is  to be
considered Cultural Heritage in UNESCO’s terms, it has to be, by the very definition of
Cultural Heritage, de-sacralised. 
 
II. Negotiating Alevi Cultural Heritage 
16 The instruments developed by UNESCO for safeguarding ICH are explicitly directed at
“communities, in particular indigenous communities” (UNESCO Convention 2003: §7).
Merkel  regards  this  as  an  attempt  to  empower  “communities”  and  correct  earlier
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rather  exclusive  misconceptions  of  heritage  that  were  directed  at  aesthetic  and
monumental  representations  of  human  kind’s  achievements  (Merkel  2011:  68).
Furthermore, this also allows these “communities” – understood in terms of networks,
not limited to specific geographic boundaries – to include diaspora groups as bearers of
their ICH (Ibid.). It is noteworthy for the case discussed here that UNESCO perceives the
recognition of Intangible Cultural Heritage as “bringing human beings closer together”
(UNESCO Convention 2003: §15). This is especially interesting when we also take into
consideration the fact that explicit allowances are made for the inclusion of instances
in which the actors of designated heritage itself transcend national borders; the criteria
for  submitting  an  application  recognizes  multi-national  nominators6.  Despite  this
opportunity  for  a  “shared  heritage”  of  Alevi  communities  across  Turkey  and the
diaspora, the case described here seems to be demonstrative of an alternative position:
The  nomination  sheet  for  the  Turkish  Alevi  semah neither  lists  any  German  Alevi
organization, such as the AABF, nor does the AABF recognize the Turkish Alevi semah as
part of its Cultural Heritage.7 In spite of its intended aspiration of “bringing human
beings closer together” the Convention can, to the contrary, be used as a means for
demarcating difference. 
 
Theoretical Considerations: Heritage, Power and Belonging
17 This exclusive notion of heritage becomes even more powerful in the light of a central
concept  of  heritage:  “categorization  and  listing”  (Harrison  2013:  6).  The  alleged
character of ICH being less hierarchic or a bottom-up process is undermined by the
very mechanisms that implement these ICHs:  listing and categorizing always has to
apply certain criteria, which inevitably ascribe value while simultaneously devaluating
others. This aspect becomes even more apparent if we take into consideration the fact
that the nation-state(s), as representatives of Cultural Heritage (next to “indigenous
groups”), have to consent to safeguarding measures, providing financial resources and
infrastructure  (UNESCO  Criteria  2012:  §3).  In  the  case  discussed  here,  the  political
rationale for recognizing Alevi Cultural Heritage as enhancing the nation’s diversity
without  adopting  this  diversity  in  a  political  and  legal  framework  is  brought  into
question.
18 Similarly,  in  both  Turkey  and  the  diaspora,  the  negotiation  of  Cultural  Heritage
between  the  Alevi  “community”,  the  nation-state,  and  UNESCO  renders  visible  the
specific imaginations about the nation, its past, its criteria for belonging, its pluralism
or its homogeneity that underpin the construction of Cultural Heritage. Referring to
this  aspect  of  heritage  policies,  Hall  has  highlighted  the  evaluating  character  of
Cultural Heritage policies. Heritage, from this perspective, is not only the desire and
the practice of preserving certain aspects of the past,  but constitutes “the symbolic
power to order knowledge, to rank, classify and arrange, and thus to give meaning to
objects  and  things  through  interpretative  schemas”  (Hall  2007/1999:  88).  These
particular formations of knowledge and mentalities of government are embodied in the
instruments, strategies, and politics applied. The approach of the “governmentality” of
heritage  tries  to  grasp  this  interrelation  of  knowledge,  power,  and  the  specific
governmental  understandings,  for  example,  of  diversity,  which  are  inscribed  in
political programmes and political practices and put into play by these very strategies
(Rose 1999: 2). Drawing on Foucault’s notion of government, which perceives political
power as an incoherent assemblage of endeavours to guide, shape, direct, conduct, and
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enhance people in a desirable way (Foucault 2004: 162), Cultural Heritage too may be
understood as a part of this assemblage and of the politics of social or national cohesion
and diversity management (Coombe 2012; Tauschek 2013: 20). The analytical power of
this concept lies in its connection between the individual and government. The conduct
of  contemporary  (neo-liberal)  government  relies  on  enhancing  individual  and
collective agents (“communities”) ability to act upon themselves, rather using ideas of
freedom,  self-fulfilment,  and  responsibility  than  domination,  law  or  coercion:
Governing, in this sense, is 
not a way to force people to do what the governor wants; it is always a versatile
equilibrium with complementarity and conflicts between techniques which assure
coercion  and  processes  through  which  the  self  is  constructed  or  modified  by
himself (Foucault 1993: 204).
19 This understanding enlarges the analytical framework for this paper in many ways.
Firstly, as discussed in the previous section, the dynamics of ritual practice constitute
the basis of adjustment for both Alevi actors and state policies. Government here is best
understood  when  the  exercise of  power  is  dissociated  from  domination.  The
governmentality of Cultural Heritage does not oppress the endeavours and capacities of
Alevi  actors  to  publicly  display  and  negotiate  their  identity  demands,  but  rather
recognizes this capacity and adjusts to it with instruments such as heritage policies.
With that being said, the construction of heritage may not only be read as an “agentive
way to act upon one’s own world” (Brosius and Polit 2011: 3), but also as a device of
government  (among many others)  to  govern  ethnic(ized)  or  religious  minorities  in
certain  ways.  If  we  are  to  grasp  the  implications  of  heritage  formation  on
empowerment and exclusion, the aspect of agency has to be discussed with deference
to  the  complex  array  of  identity  demands  and  the  (possibly  disciplining)  political
structures that provide the means “to act upon one’s own world”.
 
Alevi-Bektaşi Cultural Heritage in Turkey: Making an Alevi
“Community”
The understanding of God-human unity and that everything will return to God has
found its  way in  semah through circular  movements  which is  derived from the
movement  of  celestial  bodies.  Provided  that  this  element  is  included  in  the
Representative  List  [of  Intangible  Cultural  Heritage  (ICH)]  the  authentic
understanding of nature and universe, the symbolism and the conceptual depth of
semah will better contribute to the universal awareness in ICH.
The  human-centred  perception  of  the  world  and  the  universe  and  humanist
philosophy of semah are values which can contribute to the intercultural dialogue
(UNESCO Nomination file 2010: 6).
20 The above cited quotation is  taken from the 2010 application file  of  various  Alevi-
Bektaşi organizations in Turkey seeking to assign the semah – a sequence from the cem 
ritual  –  onto  UNESCO’s  protective  list.  The  ritual  dance’s  subsequent  successful
inscription on the Representative List  of  Intangible Cultural  Heritage also resulted in its
official recognition as a part of Turkish “folklore”, “enriching traditional music culture
in Turkey” (UNESCO Nomination file 2010: 6). Although nation-states have to support
the nomination process, a criterion for granting ICH status is that the actors, groups or
communities concerned participate in the application process (UNESCO Criteria 2012:
§3).  This  aspect  requires  an  understanding  of  the  comparative  benefits  of  creating
Cultural Heritage for both state and non-state-actors. Especially in the context of the
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Alevi-state relationship, this is particularly interesting to investigate as the (legal and
social) position of Alevis in the Turkish state is subject to heavy criticism by human
rights actors and Alevi NGOs in Turkey and abroad.
21 Alevi communities in Turkey are in an ambivalent position. On the one hand, the Law
on Dervish Lodges [Tekke ve Zaviye Kanunu] instituted in 1925 and remaining in effect,
forbade all forms of religious orders [tarikat] and associated ritual practices, clothing,
and titles.  The law also  had wider  implications  on Alevi  ritual  practice  and in  fact
constitutes  one  of  the  main  issues  in  the  struggle  for  the  recognition  of  Alevi
communities in Turkey and the diaspora (Sökefeld 2008: 236ff.). On the other hand, in
accordance  with  UNESCO  Criteria,  2012  a  number  of  Alevi-Bektaşi  cultural
organizations have been included in the application process for the recognition of their
Cultural Heritage (UNESCO Nomination file 2010: 13). The assemblage of these diverse
associations and the public practice of rituals (under the term “Alevi”) has largely been
tolerated by the Turkish authorities while the revision of the aforementioned law on
Dervish  Lodges  has  also  been  under  consideration8.  Since  2007  Alevis  may  also  be
exempt from compulsory religious education in public schools following a decision by
the European Court of Human Rights, which found Turkey to be in breach of the article
relating to The Right to Education of religious and minority identities (Dressler 2013:
7)9. Yet, tolerating the work of Alevi-Bektaşi NGOs does not amount to the legal and
political recognition of the Alevi communities as religiously different subjects with the
right to religious self-representation.
22 Alongside representatives of the state party, various NGOs of Alevi-Bektaşi character,
research  institutes,  and  academics  are  involved  in  the  construction  of  heritage  in
Turkey (UNESCO Nomination file 2010: 13f.). The Ministry of Culture and Tourism is
involved in the process of “heritagization” (Graham 2007/2002: 250), acting on behalf of
the state party. According to UNESCO Criteria, the ministry is required to act in concert
with  the  “concerned  communities”  (UNESCO  Criteria  2012  §3).  This  “concerned
community” is  represented by various Alevi-Bektaşi  NGOs10 and by local authorities
such as Nevşehir Hacıbektaş Bakanlığı. The fact that the Ministry of Culture and Tourism
has  been  instituted  by  the  nation-state  to  undertake  overall  responsibility  of  the
process  is  indicative  of  the  specific  folkloristic  and  cultural  understandings  being
applied to heritage issues; Alevi identity demands formulated within this realm thus
fail  to address the serious issue of  belonging,  rather detaching such demands from
their political origin, as will be argued in further detail below.
23 It is of significance to note that only four out of the seventeen NGOs involved in the
process operate under the heading “Alevi”, while the others refer in their naming to
the saint Hacı  Bektaş  or to tribal associations such as Tahtacı.  The close association
between “Alevi” and “Bektaşi” in many of these denominations — also evident in the
naming of the ritual in question as “Alevi-Bektaşi” heritage — may denote a certain
form of state-controlled difference: As Dressler has pointed out, the term Alevi-Bektaşi
is  used  mostly  by  Turkish  speaking  Alevis  (Dressler  2013:  19).  Although Alevis  and
Bektaşis share a lot of their ritual practices and belief systems and as such may be
imagined as  one community,  the  term also  annihilates  the  institutional,  social,  and
geographic differences between these groups. In the Ottoman period, the Bektaşis as a
religious order [tarikat], served a specific administrative purpose via its zaviyes [dervish
lodges]  and  affiliations  with  the  janissary  corps  of  the  Ottoman army.  In  contrast,
Alevis — or more appropriately,  the communities in Anatolia that have come to be
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identified as the predecessors of present-day Alevis, historically referred to as Kızılbaş
11 — were socially and economically marginalized and temporarily heavily persecuted
due to their alliances with Shiite missionaries from Iran (Ibid., 18). However, already
towards  the  end  of  the  16th century  a  state-favoured  process  of  socio-economic
assimilation had been set in motion, linking the Kızılbaş communities to the Bektaşis in
order to undermine sectarianism among the Kızılbaş of Anatolia (Faroqhi 1992: 176).
Still, as Kieser argues, there have never been any strong ties between Kurdish speaking
Kızılbaş  from  southeast  Anatolia  and  the  Bektaşis  residing  in  central  and  western
Anatolia (Kieser 2003). Neither can it be said that all Turkish Alevi ocaks12 maintained
any form of relations with the Bektaşi Order. According to Dressler, the emphasis on an
Alevi-Bektaşi synthesis may be read as a means of strengthening Alevi agency in the
Turkish  public  sphere  by  weakening  the  notion  of  social  and  cultural  differences
between Turkish and Kurdish speaking Alevis and the Bektaşis (Dressler 2013: 19).
24 Although the character of  these denominations may be losing their  ideological  and
discursive  clarity13, the  organizations  in  charge  of  constructing  an  Alevi-Bektaşi
Heritage refer to themselves in the nomination file as an “Alevi-Bektaşi Order” thereby
excluding any alternative form of Alevism, which refuses to subscribe to the Bektaşi
notion of  Alevi  identity:  The “Alevi-Bektaşi  Order  has  distinguished itself  from the
mainstream Alevi belief system, with respect to its roots, formation processes and current
cultural background” (UNESCO, Nomination file:  2,  my italics).  The specificities that
comprise the “current cultural  background”,  however,  remain ambiguously defined.
The distinction drawn between the “Alevi-Bektaşi Order” and “mainstream Alevism”
regarding their formation processes and current background suggests a stratification,
which orders various forms of Alevism and explicitly sets the Alevi-Bektaşi Order apart
from  other  (unnamed)  interpretations  of  Alevism.  Despite  this  distinction,  which
acknowledges the Alevi-Bektaşi Order as the cultural-bearer of an Alevi Heritage, the
UNESCO  Nomination  file,  2010  also  emphasizes  the  “richness  in  semah culture”
(UNESCO Nomination file 2010: 4) and names various “Alevi Bektaşi communities” as
“bearers and practitioners of the semah tradition” (Ibid., 2). The Nomination file, 2010
requires the identification of the geographical location of the communities and groups
concerned  with  the  designated  heritage.  Although  the  Alevi-Bektaşi  Order  is
distinguished  from  mainstream  Alevism,  the  geographical  range  afforded  to  Alevi
communities  extends  to  almost  all  of  the  Anatolian  region.  Such  an  expansive
(geographical)  definition,  therefore,  encompasses  very  different  Alevi  and  Bektaşi
groups like the Babağan Bektaşis and Alevi ocaks from central and eastern Anatolia,
which  distinguish  themselves  from one  another  through the  principle  of  initiation
(Babağan Bektaşis) or descent as means of belonging. At least for some of the Anatolian
ocaks  it  is  —  historically  speaking  —  difficult  to  uphold  any  relationship  with  the
Bektaşi Order (Dressler 2013: 17). However, a consequence of involvement in Cultural
Heritage policy-making has been the alliance of different organizations representing
diverse Alevi identities and interests under the label of “Alevi-Bektaşi”. The list of the
“concerned  community  organization(s)  and  representative(s)”  (UNESCO  Nomination
file 2010: 13) also contains those associations like CEM Vakfı and the Pir Sultan Abdal
Kültür Dernekleri, which politically and religiously follow quite different agendas. CEM
Vakfı, for example, represents the position of Alevism as an Islamic tradition, while the
Pir Sultan Abdal Foundation clearly distances itself from such claims, perceiving Alevism
to be a religion on its own right (Dressler 2013: 7).
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25 In order to bring such divergent actors together, the heritage of semah is thus designed
and described accordingly. Distinguishing between içeri and dışarı semah [private and
public  semah]  the  ritual  dance  is  defined  to  comprehend  both  its  religious  and
folkloristic / cultural meanings. Recognition that “It is not desirable to perform içeri 
semah in front of those without faith” (UNESCO Nomination file 2010: 5) represents the
position of Alevi organizations wishing to preserve the religious and sacred character
of the ritual. The dışarı semah, in contrast, addresses organizations like the Hacı Bektaş
Veli Kültür ve Tanıtma Dernekleri that rather focus on the folkloristic aspects of Alevism
for  the  purpose  of  its  presentation  to  outsiders  and  the  schooling  of  younger
generations  (Massicard  2013:  49).  Interestingly,  the  recognition  of  semah as  a
commemoration of the prophet Muhammad’s meeting with the so-called kırklar meclisi
[the assembly of the forty saints of Alevism] is not mentioned in the description of the
semah as Alevi-Bektaşi heritage. Although many Alevis believe that it was during this
meeting the semah was danced for the first time (Langer 2008: 98), the connection of the
dance with the prophet Muhammad is omitted from the document. In the context of
negotiating an understanding of Alevism as a religion or culture this may be once again
indicative of the rather de-sacralised and folkloristic interpretation of the semah. 
26 The  question  of  folklore  is  quite  an  important  issue  in  the  Alevis  struggle  for
recognition. First and foremost, it is one that is directly linked to financial demands
regarding the payment of religious personal by the state. While Sunni Imams are paid
by the state, Alevi religious authorities cannot be sponsored publicly, as the cemevi is
not considered a “prayer house”, but a “cultural house” (Dressler 2013: 10). In response
to a question about the situation, the former Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan replied:
Whichever Alevi I meet says, we are Muslims. The prayer place for Muslims is the
mosque. Alevism is not a religion [din]. Therefore one cannot compare [Islam and
Alevism]. If we made this distinction, why should we divide Turkey? One is a house
for  prayer;  the  other  is  a  culture  house.  Cem houses  cannot  receive  the  same
[financial] assistance that the mosques receive. If there is somebody who wants to
support cem houses this cannot be hindered (cited in Sökefeld 2008: 245).
27 Although the UNESCO Nomination file explicitly accepts the semah as part of the cem 
ritual — and by implication acknowledges that it is part of the religious practices of
Alevi-Bektaşi adherents — there are also strong folkloristic connotations; the ritual is
also  ascribed  the  function  of  “enriching  (the)  traditional  music  culture  of  Turkey”
(UNESCO  Nomination  file  2010:  6).  As  the  quote  at  the  beginning  of  this  section
suggests,  alongside  this  rather  vernacular  characterization  of  semah,  the  ritual
sequence  is  also  described  as  maintaining  a  “humanist  philosophy”,  which  “can
contribute to intercultural dialogue” (Ibid.). Both the vernacular and universal aspects
of  semah serve  to  detach  the  ritual  dance  from  its  religious  context.  In  the  same
manner,  the  participation of  both  men and women together  in  the  dance  has  also
assumed  symbolic  significance  (Ibid.,  5):  Contemporary  gender  equality  issues  are
expressed  through  the  nomination  file  as  the  dance  and  the  designated  Cultural
Heritage are understood to signify the explicit rejection of “gender discrimination” by
all Alevi-Bektaşi communities (Ibid.). This aspect highlights the character of Cultural
Heritage as inherently linked to contemporary issues and needs (Graham 2007/2002:
251).  Likewise,  the  ICH  Convention  itself,  through  the  principle  of  heritage  as
empowering the instrument of protection strikingly reveals the capacity of heritage as
a “useable past” (Merkel 2011). As Intangible Cultural Heritage the semah has to fulfil
multiple  functions  yielding  a  performativity,  which  explicitly  raises  “awareness”;
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awareness  for  “local  literature”  in  addition  to  the  safeguarding  of  the  Intangible
Cultural Heritage of human kind in general (UNESCO Nomination file 2010: 6).
28 Despite the recognition of the diversity of Alevi groups and communities in Turkey, the
state nevertheless  continues to privilege one particular  form of  organization:  those
who  are  willing  to  integrate  themselves  into  the  Alevi-Bektaşi  imagination  of
belonging. Here the state party becomes visible as a powerful actor in this allegedly
bottom-up process. A fundamental paradox of the process remains that despite the ICH
Convention’s intended inclusion of “indigenous communities”, without the state these
communities have no opportunity of accessing UNESCO’s protective mechanisms for
Cultural Heritage. An unchanged condition institutes the concerned state party — in
Turkey  represented  by  the  Ministry  of  Culture  and  Tourism  —  with  the  overall
responsibility  for  listing  the  element  in  question  on  the  National  Inventory  of  the
Intangible  Cultural  Heritage (UNESCO  Criteria  2012:  §3).  This  aspect  accentuates  the
necessity of engaging state interest in safeguarding certain (vernacular) communities’
Cultural Heritage.
 
Alevi Cultural Heritage in the “Opposition Diaspora”
29 In May 2013 an informational conference held for parties interested in the application
and nomination process of Intangible Cultural Heritage was organized by a regional
UNESCO bureau in Lübeck, Germany. At this conference a representative of the AABF in
Hamburg asked about the possibility of inscribing the Alevi semah ritual on the list
(given the prohibition of its performance in Turkey) (Tauschek 2013: 23). No mention,
however,  was  made  of  the  fact  that  the  ritual  had  already  been  inscribed  on  the
Representative  List.  The  omission  of  this  detail  was  perceived  to  be  of  little
consequence to the AABF organizers14 who did not regard their interests (and indeed
their Cultural Heritage) as being legitimately represented by either the Turkish state or
by (some of) the Alevi-Bektaşi communities involved in the process of heritagisation in
Turkey. The recognition of an Alevi-Bektaşi Cultural Heritage in Turkey by UNESCO has
done little to change the general perception of AABF actors that Alevis in Turkey still
do not enjoy the same religious freedoms as their Sunni Muslim counterparts or in
comparison to Germany.
30 These  findings  reveal  the  inherently  dissonant  nature  of  heritage,  a  dissonance,  as
Ashworth points out, that is less caused by vague or inconsistent definitions of the term
itself (Ashworth 2011: 19), but by its constructed and thus easily contestable character.
According  to  Tunbridge  and  Ashworth,  such  a  dissonance  may  be  caused  by  the
geographical diffusion of populations and cultures (Tunbridge and Ashworth 2007: 225).
I  do not  wish to  imply here that  the notion of  Alevi  ritual  heritage in  Germany is
somehow “misplaced” or “in the wrong place” (Ibid.) as an aspect of this dissonance as
such a perspective would misguidedly reproduce the highly normative idea of heritage
belonging  to  a  certain  territory  or  a  certain  nation.  An  understanding  of  the
negotiation of heritage in “transnational space”, however, allows us to overcome some
of the limitations inherent in the concept of original belonging; dissociating heritage
from homogeneous, national or territorial understandings of origin rather facilitates
an insight into heritage as a dissonant product of social practice and negotiation (Falser
and Juneja 2013: 24).
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31 The possibilities and constraints for reaching a shared consensus for the safeguarding
of Cultural Heritage in the context of geographically dispersed communities with an
(assumed) common heritage has been discussed by Merkel (Merkel 2011: 69). However,
Merkel does not adequately take into consideration the possibility of intra-communal
conflict over the question of legitimate representation and the ownership of heritage.
Yet, in the case of Alevi Cultural Heritage in Germany and Turkey this constitutes an
important issue for deliberation. In the particular case of semah being recognized as
Alevi-Bektaşi  heritage  in  Turkey,  the  question  of  the  legitimate  governance  and
representation of  heritage  emerges:  AABF actors  in  Germany do not  perceive  their
heritage as being protected so long as it is represented by the Turkish state and certain
Alevi-Bektaşi organizations.15 Although the AABF maintains quite close relations with
some of the organizations involved in the heritage process in Turkey, in Germany they
nevertheless  promote  their  own  political  agenda  for  safeguarding  Alevi  Cultural
Heritage. Intra-communal ruptures between German and Turkish Alevi organizations
become visible in this case because the UNESCO instrument designed for advancing
their  particular  recognition  fails  to  account  for  these  competing  perceptions  of
legitimate representation. 
32 It  is  here  in  the  different  political  and  geographical  positions  occupied  by  Alevi
organizations involved in the negotiation of Alevi Cultural Heritage that the dissonance
of  heritage  emerges.  The  argumentation  of  the  AABF  representative,  rather  than
offering an insight into how such dissonance may be resolved or harmonized, instead is
indicative of the way in which it is “turned into a constructive imagination of identity”
(Graham  2007/2002:  252).  Reference  to  the  semah ritual  sequence  as  Alevi  Cultural
Heritage  and to  the  limitations  placed  on  the  performance  of  the  ritual  in  Turkey
serves to criticize the ongoing marginalization of Alevi identities in Turkey. The point
here is, of course, not to argue about the issue of whether or not the semah — as it has
been publicly presented and recognized as Cultural Heritage — can indeed be regarded
as  having  been  “forbidden”.  Critical  analysis  does  not  negate  the  assertion  of  a
marginalized and excluded Alevi collective identity by subtle and less subtle methods.
Rather, the statement is to be taken – analytically – at face value in order to grasp the
underlying  understandings  of  Cultural  Heritage  and the  corresponding  notions  of
nation, community, and belonging it elicits.
33 Formulating  an  endeavour  for  safeguarding  the  semah “against  the  nation  state  of
origin”  (Sökefeld  2008:  250)  serves  to  criticize  current  political  practice  in  Turkey,
which continues to deny the recognition of Alevism as a legitimate part of the nation
with distinct characteristics from Sunni Islam. The expression “being forbidden” thus
employed by the AABF representative in connection with the cem-ceremonies of which
the  semah  constitutes  an  important  part,  alludes  to  the  specific  form  of  diversity
politics  exercised in Turkey.  The ritual  is  tolerated and under the label  of  Cultural
Heritage even promoted as folklore serving to enrich Turkey’s cultural diversity. Yet,
what  is  at  stake  in  the  struggle  for  recognition  is  the  attainment  of  comparative
equality  (in  religious  terms)  with  Sunni  Islam  (Sökefeld  2005:  226).  References  to
Cultural Heritage and the endeavour to ensure its safeguarding thus enables the AABF
to hint at these political deficits in an intergovernmental arena. As Merkel points out,
the negotiation of Intangible Cultural Heritage in contexts of migration and nationally
separated  communities  enables  the  groups  concerned  to  question  the  legitimate
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representation  (or  usurpation)  of  the  communities’  heritage  by  the  nation  state(s)
involved:
Even where direct human rights abuse is not an issue, legitimacy of government in
representing the interests of the living cultural traditions of communities might be
challenged or questioned by the groups concerned (Merkel 2011: 69).
34 The issue of Human Rights generally constitutes an important component of the AABF’s
critique  of  Turkish  policies  towards  Alevis  (see,  for  example,  Alevitische  Gemeinde
Deutschland e. V. 2013: 2), and yet it was not invoked in this particular context by the
representative  of  the  AABF.  Still,  references  to  intergovernmental  regimes  such  as
UNESCO  provide  the  discursive  and  institutional  framework  for  the  articulation  of
alternative  versions  of  Alevi  heritage  in  the  Diaspora  and  thus  challenge  other
perceived illegitimate representations of this heritage. An Alevi heritage that sets itself
apart from the existing Alevi-Bektaşi heritage therefore also demonstrates the refusal
to subscribe to a dominantly Turkish-speaking notion of Alevism or be assimilated into
the folklorized cultural heritage as it is expressed in Turkey.
35 Furthermore, the concept of Intangible Cultural Heritage is useful for the AABF as it fits
in with their political programme on integration in Germany. The humanist ideas of
Alevism, which also finds its representation in the Turkish-Alevi nomination form for
semah, is frequently invoked in integration discourse in Germany. AABF actors insist on
the fact that Alevi values are far less different from German values than those of Sunni
Muslims  (Sökefeld  2008:  250).  This,  in  turn,  facilitates  an  argument  for  the
categorization of semah on the German National Inventory of Cultural Heritage, a necessary
move with regards to the conditions established by UNESCO Criteria, 2012 if Intangible
Cultural Heritage status is to be granted. Here too, the agency of the nation-state in the
process  of  heritagisation  may  heavily  influence  or  even  prevent  Alevi  endeavours.
During the above-mentioned conference, a representative from the ministry in charge
expressed her doubts about the prospective recognition of the semah ritual as Cultural
Heritage,  emphasizing the position that  religious elements  were generally  excluded
from the nomination process (Tauschek 2013: 24). Thus, safeguarding the semah ritual
within UNESCO’s terms requires its de-sacralisation. Such a cultural understanding of
the cem ritual in general and the semah dance in particular is not uncontested — by
either  Alevis  in  Germany or  in  Turkey.  Yet,  as  Sökefeld  argues,  the  discursive  and
institutional contexts of both countries differ considerably. A cultural and folkloristic
notion of Alevi ritual practice in Turkey, as the Erdoğan quote above indicates, is from
the viewpoint of the AABF almost equal to its negation (Sökefeld 2005: 225). This also
explains  how  the  ritual  may  be  interpreted  as  being  “forbidden”  in  Turkey,  while
simultaneously recognized as Cultural Heritage. In Germany, on the other hand, such a
culturalized comprehension of the term does not necessarily bear the same negative or
pejorative  connotations,  although  the  position  of  the  AABF  is  by  no  means
unchallenged by other Alevi organizations in Germany (Ibid.).
 
III. Heritage, Empowerment and Discipline
36 As  has  been  made  clear,  references  to  Intangible  Cultural  Heritage  in  Turkey  and
Germany  may  serve  vernacular  communities  or  marginalized  groups  in  society  by
protecting elements of their culture perceived to be in danger. Wulf underlines the
“symbolic  meaning”  of  Cultural  Heritage  for  the  formation  and  reassertion  of
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community because it fosters a sense of common values, practices or roots (Wulf 2011:
83). This aspect of heritage with which members of certain groups identify, must be
stressed  here  because  it  is  integral  to  comprehending  the  underlying  rationale  of
UNESCO’s  Intangible  Cultural  Heritage  Convention.  With  regard  to  the  aims  of  the
convention, Merkel points out that a “psychological sense of ownership” can generate
activity for discovering, documenting, and researching Cultural Heritage (Merkel 2011:
60). In these terms,  Brosius  and Polit  also draw attention to the aspect  of  Cultural
Heritage that enhances a community’s  awareness of  its  heritage and its  capacity to
articulate identity demands vis-à-vis the nation-state:
[T]rading rituals as one’s own cultural product — thus turning ritual into heritage
— does not mean to render these rituals dead in the sense that it mummifies them.
Instead, this is to be understood as an agentive way to act upon one’s own world
(Brosius and Polit 2011: 2)
37 Such accounts emphasize the empowering potential gained through the construction of
Intangible Cultural Heritage for (vernacular) groups. The enhancement of agency that
it  entails  (or  intends  to  entail)  plays  a  critical  role  in  the  evaluation  of  UNESCO’s
instruments. The authors cited here underline the capacity of ICH to act as a cultural
resource.  This  is  especially  important  in  the  context  of  migration  and  diasporas,
because Intangible Heritage is not necessarily place-bound in the same way as other
forms of heritage such as monuments and the like (Ibid.: 3).
38 This  latter  point  is  applicable  to  the  case  study described in  this  paper:  The  Alevi
diaspora in Germany may refer to the same ritual as their own particular heritage, just
as  other  Alevi  communities  had  done  in  Turkey  before  them.  Due  to  the  specific
character of the Alevi community in Germany — as an “opposition diaspora” (Sökefeld
2008: 250), represented in this context by the AABF — it may be said that UNESCO and
its  instruments  provided  the  discursive  and  institutional  framework  for  the
articulation of  a  version of  semah heritage  in  Germany.  Although Alevi  heritage  in
Germany is not yet recognized as such, it is possible to acknowledge the argument that
reference to  a  claimed (Alevi)  heritage may be potentially  empowering.  Within the
rationale  of  semah as  Alevi  Cultural  Heritage in  Germany lies  a  critique of  the still
marginalized  position  of  Alevis  in  Turkey.  Although the  AKP government  officially
launched a democratic “Alevi opening” in 2007, aimed at improving the relationship
between the government and the Alevi population, reference to UN bodies like UNESCO
and to international legislation like the Human Rights Convention may serve yet again
to enhance the visibility of ongoing subtle and less subtle forms of suppression.
39 However,  acceptance  of  this  perspective  on  the  empowering  capacities  of  Cultural
Heritage policies tends to overestimate UNESCO’s intergovernmental influence vis-à-vis
nation-states. It takes for granted the idea that policies on “minorities” (of all kinds)
yield empowering and liberating forces for the good of these very “minorities”. Such an
approach  fails  to  grasp  the  disciplining  aspects  of  these  policies,  which  not  only
empower, but simultaneously inscribe a certain understanding of “minority” identity
that  renders  them  detached  from  a  perceived  political  centre  represented  by  the
“majority”16. Although UNESCO provides the AABF with the language and institutions
to  articulate  its  own  diasporic  heritage,  it  is  not  yet  clear  whether  the  German
authorities in charge would inscribe the semah on the National Inventory of Intangible
Cultural Heritage, a necessary measure if it is to be also inscribed on UNESCO’s list. The
point at which state parties join in the process of heritagisation is also the point of
potential (re)nationalisation and exclusion. In Germany the issue of Alevi heritage may
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result  in  the  need  to  once  again  redress  the  question  of  Germany  being  an
“immigration country” [Einwanderungsland]. The negotiation of diversity and pluralism
at  stake in  Germany differs  from the situation in  Turkey.  In the latter  case,  Alevi-
Bektaşi heritage has already been awarded through its UNESCO-endorsed inscription
on  the  Representative  List  and  the  Turkish  National  Inventory  of  Heritage.  Yet,
recognition  of  pluralism  and  the  Alevi-Bektaşis’  contribution  to  Turkey’s  cultural
diversity does not touch on sensitive political issues, such as the recognition of Alevism
as  a  religious  community.  The  semah as  Alevi  Cultural  Heritage  is  perceived  to  be
folklore and as such is easily accommodated within the Turkish-nationalist narrative of
unity,  which  allows  diverse  forms  of  cultural  expression  to  exist,  but  without
corresponding acknowledgement in a legal framework. In this setting of “disciplined
liberalization” (Tambar 2014: 84), claims for Alevi religious education in schools or for a
state-paid religious infrastructure may continue to be denied.
40 The  heritage  of  vernacular  groups  or  “indigenous  communities”  (to  employ  the
language of UNESCO) indeed produces some forms of cultural diversity and visibility.
However, as the nation-state remains the ultimate arbitrator in decisions relating to
the National Inventory of Cultural Heritage, this diversity continues to be articulated in
the form of “domesticated diversity” (Göner 2005: 127). Diversity as it thus emerges is
not only invoked to fulfil an ideological or political purpose, but the particular form it
takes  is  also  the result  of  the intrinsic  nature of  heritage itself  and its  capacity  to
categorize, list, include and exclude (Harrison 2013: 164). Furthermore, the recognition
of Alevis on a comparative legal-political basis with Sunni Islam, seems to have been
traded  for  cultural  recognition.  In  such  contexts,  Ashworth  argues  that  heritage
discourse may be “used deliberately to render insignificant the ideas and practices that
could potentially challenge or distract a dominant ideology” (Ashworth 2011: 34). He
speaks of “museumification” to denote this specific aspect of heritage policies, which
transforms  cultural  expressions  of  (political  /  social  /  religious  /  ethnic[ized])
minorities into folklore thereby undermining their capacities for political participation
and resistance (Ibid., 33).
41 Ashworth’s  argument  challenges  the  emphasis  on  agency,  which  is  supposed  to  be
enhanced  by  UNESCO’s  instruments.  His  idea  of  “museumification”  and
“vernacularization”  (Ibid.,  34)  rather  contests  the  liberal  notion  of  the  ability  of
individuals and communities “to act upon their own world” (Brosius and Polit 2011: 2)
and hints at the (marginal) position that these groups adopt in heritage discourse or
which  is  ascribed  to  them.  The  sets  of  knowledge  about  the  past  and  diversity,
embodied in the policies and practices of Intangible Cultural Heritage, thus renders
very  specific  imaginations  about  belonging  legible,  firm,  and  true.  Alevi-Bektaşi
Cultural Heritage may enrich Turkey’s diversity, but it is thought of as a rather (dead
and indeed “mummified”)  folkloristic  facet,  detached from its  political  context.  An
understanding  of  Cultural  Heritage  as  governmentality  enables  us  to  grasp  the
hegemonic  knowledge  inscribed  in  Heritage  policies  and  put  into  practice  by  its
“safeguarding” measures. This perspective allows us to analyse the above-mentioned
aspects  of  “museumification”  and “vernacularization”  as  forms of  political  conduct
that  rely  on  a  wide  assemblage  of  instruments  guiding,  directing,  enhancing,  and
shaping the populations’ will to act upon itself. What was labelled a “discursive and
institutional frame” providing the language and the modes of organization in heritage
construction, within this light is reconsidered as a mode of governmental conduct that
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does not draw on the semantics of rule, law, or coercion to guide the population in
desired ways. In the present context of ongoing physical political violence in Turkey it
is particularly important to emphasize that the recognition of subtle forms of political
power does not mean to imply that other less subtle forms of conduct or even violent
interventions have ceased to exist.  However,  taking a perspective on the close link
between power and knowledge enables us to grasp both the governmental mind in its
capacity  “to  rank,  classify  and  arrange”  (Hall  2007/1999:  88)  knowledge  and  the
communities’  adjustments  to  these  schemas.  The  “communities”  addressed,  on  the
other hand, are the very agents that put these schemas into practice: The policies on
Cultural  Heritage,  for  example,  produce  forms  of  Alevi-Bektaşi  subjectivities  that
intersect with “modernist-secular” or “traditionalist-religious” cleavages, the terms of
which  are  employed  to  characterize  the  various  organizations  active  within  these
policies  (Soner  and  Toktaş  2011:  423).  Rather,  the  governmentalities  of  Cultural
Heritage  turn  them  into  productive  forces  that  negotiate  an  Alevi-Bektaşi  Cultural
Heritage.  Furthermore,  this negotiated Cultural  Heritage may also be recognized by
diverse  organizations  that  differ  considerably  in  their  comparative  positions,  for
example, as demonstrated by the respective views expressed by CEM Vakfı and the Pir
Sultan Abdal Kültür Dernekleri on the issue of Alevism as an inner Islamic tradition or a
religion in its own right (Dressler 2013: 7).
42 This  approach  also  comes  to  terms  not  only  with  the  focus  on  community
empowerment in ICH discourse, but also with the constitution of Alevism as a socio-
religious problem of a (nationalist / neoliberal) government. The ostensible tension and
the alleged binary distinctions between liberation and control, inclusion and exclusion,
empowerment and containment, can be analysed as a form of political conduct that
engenders  very  specific  sets  of  knowledge  about  belonging  and  diversity,  which
recognizes this pluralism as Cultural Heritage, but does not translate it into equivalent
political and legal recognition. The “communities” to be empowered play a crucial role
in the enactment of these forms of knowledge in order to render them true (Rose 1999:
167). The institutions and language provided by UNESCO’s heritage measures make one
“community”  of  heterogeneous  Alevi-Bektaşi  organizations  intelligible  in  the  first
place  and  produce  the  very  subject  of  cultural  difference  it  comes  to  represent.
Furthermore, the “communities” sustain the regimes of heritage as they “contribute to
the universal awareness on ICH” (UNESCO Nomination file 2010: 6).
43 UNESCO’s heritage regime and all the positive and empowering semantics it brings to
bear may thus be scrutinized as creating certain subjectivities, certain emotions, and
certain  behaviours  that  are  inherently  directed  towards  heritage  itself.  This
perspective  not  only  uncovers  “new  domains  of  governance  and  intervention”
(Coombe 2012:  382) in the politics of Cultural Heritage,  but also allows us to better
understand  the  fact  that  heritage  construction  encompasses  more  than  mere
empowerment or the emotional need for preservation. As has been argued in the case
of Alevi-Bektaşi  Intangible Cultural  Heritage in Turkey,  this  heritage may engender
vernacularization or “museumifiction” of  the past,  which stratifies  cultural  life  and
religious expression in certain ways and renders them detached from the present, as
Ashworth has observed (Ashworth 2011: 35). This has significant political implications
on the Alevi struggle for recognition and cannot be grasped when the multiple forms of
influence on peoples’  behaviour,  desire,  opinions and so forth are excluded from a
discussion on heritage and its empowering and disciplining forces.
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44 The inherently constructed, dissonant and political character of cultural heritage was
taken up here as an axiomatic starting point of analysis. The question to be answered
was not one of whether heritage can or cannot be used for multiple political purposes,
but rather this paper sought to examine the ways in which the concept of heritage has
been used in the Alevi struggle for recognition in Turkey and Germany and ask how
these particular constructs are turned into socially generative forms of subjectivity and
identity constructions.
45 The articulation of semah as Alevi heritage in Germany in parallel with Turkey supports
the notion of heritage as empowering the means of  opposition.  The AABF does not
recognize  Alevi-Bektaşi  heritage  in  Turkey  as  “their”  heritage  and  questions  the
legitimacy  of  being  represented  by  both  the  Alevi-Bektaşi  organizations  and  the
Turkish state. In this case, the ICH as an instrument of UNESCO provides the vocabulary
and  institutional  framework  for  the  referral  of  its  own  respective  Alevi  Intangible
Cultural Heritage in Germany, thereby revealing the dissonant character of heritage
and unveiling its capacity for critique. The mere phenomenon of semah being perceived
as Alevi heritage in Germany demonstrates the fact that minorities (of all  kinds) do
refer to this political instrument for their identity demands. Yet, this also evokes the
political question of belonging, which potentially limits the capability of the ICH to
achieve its aspirational principles of empowerment. The decision about who may refer
to Intangible Cultural Heritage and who may use it as a political and cultural resource
lies with the state party, — a fact that severely canonizes heritage and has significant
implications  for  thinking  about  diversity.  In  the  Turkish  case  described  here,  the
folklorization of an Alevi ritual through heritage discourse, furthermore, corresponds
to  a  political  understanding  of  the  socio-religious  stratification  of  Sunni  Islam and
Alevism, which again supports the endeavour to place Alevi demands for recognition in
the (less subversive) realm of culture and not religion. 
46 This aspect seriously limits the capacity of ICH to enhance agency among Alevi-Bektaşi
civil  actors  in  Turkey.  As  the  promotion  of  Alevi-Bektaşi  Cultural  Heritage  is  not
accompanied by legal recognition, “museumification” becomes an interrelated notion
of  heritage,  detaching vernacularized  groups  from present,  critical  questions  about
political participation and human rights. This facet of heritage’s performativity and its
use for a nationalist narrative in Turkey requires the analysis of heritage as a mode of
governmental  intervention  and guidance,  which  draws  on  enhancing  activities  in
certain  desirable  ways.  Increasing  references  to  cultural  heritage  in  politics,
scholarship, and by NGOs, therefore, have to be understood and explored within the
context of  the multiple  functions that  they perform: On the one hand,  for  identity
demands and empowerment; and, on the other hand, for political intervention and new
forms of subjectivity. 
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NOTES
1. The term “Alevi-Bektaşi” is not my own, but is one that is used in the above-cited UNESCO
nomination  file  to  denominate  the  community  of  various  Alevi  and  Bektaşi  organizations
involved in the process of heritage construction. The different historical and social trajectories of
these groups are discussed in part three of this paper.
2. The cem ritual is a congregational ritual among Alevis. The sequence semah is one of various
different parts which constitute the ritual. For an overview on Alevi rituals see Langer 2008, for
an idealtypical description of the cem see Karolewski (2005).
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3. The cemevi is the place where the cem ritual takes place. Although possibly any profane place
may be rendered into a cemevi, Alevi organizations tend to provide central places for gathering.
However,  these buildings are not subject to statefunding, which renders their status unequal
compared to sunni muslim mosques.
4. For  an  overview  of  Alevi  ritual  practice,  see  for  example  Langer  (2008).  The  (ongoing)
resentment against Alevi ritual practice is analyzed in its historical context by Karolewski (2008).
5. For a description of the various sequences of the cem ritual see Langer (2008). 
6. Coombe mentions the example of ascribing Capoeira mestres outside Brazil with the title of
ambassadors of Brazilian Cultural Heritage, which considers actors outside the nation-state of
origin as bearers and representatives of their Cultural Heritage (Coombe 2012: 384).
7. Personal  note  from Interview with  an  AABF representative  held  on  17  December  2013  in
Hamburg.
8. Berber, Mehmet Ali: “Cemevleri için tekke ve zaviye yasası değişiyor”, Sabah Gazetesi, 01. 07.
2013.
9. However,  the favourable  ruling in  the case  of  Hasan and Eylem Zengin is  not  universally
applicable. Every Alevi pupil seeking to be exempt from class has to present a judgment in their
own name from a Turkish court to the Ministry of Education, despite the ruling by the European
Court of Human Rights that the exemption procedure was ineffectual for the respect of religious
minority rights.
10. These  include:  Alevi-Bektaşi  Federasyonu;  Hacı  Bektaş  Veli  Anadolu  Kültür  Vakfı  Genel
Merkezi;, Hacı Bektaş Veli Kültür ve Tanıtma Dernekleri Genel Merkezi; Pir Sultan Abdal Kültür
Derneği Genel Merkezi; Pir Sultan Abdal 2 Temmuz Kültür ve Eğitim Vakfı, Karacaahmet Sultan
Eğitim ve Kültür Vakfı;  CEM Vakfı  Genel Merkezi; Dünya Ehl-I Beyt Vakfı;  Ankara Cem Kültür
Evlerini Yaptırma Derneği; Hüseyingazi Derneği; Hubyar Sultan Alevi Kültür Derneği; Hacı Bektaş
Derneği; İstanbul Alevi Kültür Derneği; Tahtacı Kültür Eğitim Kalkınma ve Yardımlaşma Derneği;
Turhal Kültür  ve  Dayanışma  Derneği;  Gazi  Üniversitesi  Türk  Kültürü  ve  Hacı  Bektaş  Veli
Araştırma Merkezi; and the Alevilik Araştırma Dokümentasyon ve Uygulama Enstitüsü (UNESCO
nomination file: 14).
11. According to Dressler the term ‘Alevi’ has a rather young origin, its emergence dating back –
in its narrower sense – to the 19th and early 20th century (Dressler 2013b: 70). It has often been
claimed  that  ‘Kızılbaş’  was  the  historical  term  for  ‘Alevi’  (see  Karakaya-Stump  2013:  279).
Although not an entirely incorrect assertion, such a narrative suggests that all present day Alevis
are the descendants of the Kızılbaş. It thus fails to grasp either the complex semantic layers of
the historical usage of the term ‘Alevi’ as “(any) follower of Ali” or the various anachronistic
projections of a longue durée Alevi identity in Anatolia..
12. The term ocak - “hearth” in the Alevi context refers to the holy family lineages.
13. For example, the Alevi-Bektaşi Federasyonu is rather critical about the AKP’s policies towards
Alevis (Soner and Toktaş 2011: 424).
14. Interview  conducted  on  17  December  in  Hamburg  with  the  aforementioned  AABF
representative.
15. Personal note from an interview held on 17 December in Hamburg. 
16. Additionally, the Turkish term for minority, azınlık, bears a rather negative connotation as
Alevis would rather regard themselves as constitutive part of the (original idea) of the Republic
(Dressler 2014: 144f.)
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ABSTRACTS
The accelerating references to Cultural Heritage in politics and scholarship have impacted on
‘vernacular’ or migrant communities’ aspirations for the recognition of their distinct identities
and have likewise influenced nation-states’ policies on cultural diversity. Thus Alevi communities
in Turkey and Germany have used the institutions and language provided by intergovernmental
actors to claim recognition of their Intangible Cultural Heritage. In 2010, the Alevi-Bektaşi ritual
dance, semah, was inscribed onto Turkey’s National Inventory for Intangible Cultural Heritage.
However, Alevis in Germany, also drawing on the semah as their “useable past”, recently initiated
their  own  heritage  project.  This  paper  analyses  the  various  functions  and  uses  of  heritage
discourse  in  the  context  of  its  exercise  by  both  state  and  non-state  actors  in  Germany and
Turkey.  It  will  be  argued  that  a  critical  investigation  must  question  the  empowering  and
disciplining aspects of the governmentalities of Cultural Heritage because, as demonstrated by
the  Turkish  case,  recognition  of  (Alevi)  heritage  does  not  necessarily  translate  into  legal
recognition.
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